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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UTAH LIQUOR CoNTROL CoM MISSION,

Plaintiff,
vs.
THE DISTRICT c·ouRT OF THE
SEYENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT' IN
AND FOR CARBON CouNTY, STATE
OF UTAH, and ·GEORGE ·CHRiiSTENSEN, one ;of the Judges thereof,

Defendants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
This is an original action ibrought in the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah by the Utah Liquor Control
C·ommission, against the 18eventh Judicial District C;ourt
of the State of Utah in and for Carbon County, and
George Christensen, one of its Judges, seeking a Writ of
Prohibition and Wri~t ·Of Mandate in aid thereof. The
question involved grows out of the issuance of .certain
O:vder.s by defendant, the Honorable George Christensen,
in .the ease of Uta,h Liquor Control Commission v. Victor
Martelle, et al., being case No. 5064 in the District ~Court
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of the Seventh Judicial District in and for Carbo·n County, Utah, wherein the plaintiff sought to rc.onfiscate certain whiskey, implements, fur'Iliture, fixtures and any
other pers-onal property seized in a .certain beer parlor,
known a.s the. Town Tavern, 2.22 South Main., Helper,
Carbon County, Utah, by Inspe-ctors ;of the above named
plaintiff under authority of Section 164, ·Chapter 43,
Laws of Utah, 193-5.
STATEMENT OF 'THE C.A!SE.
1

That ·bn the 25th day of January, 1940, Perry Holt,
·Inspe-ctor of the Utah Liquor Control ·Commission, appeared before J. W. Hammond, Justice o.f the Peace in
rund for Price Precinct, Carbon ·County, Utah, and there
signed an Information, (Exhibit '·'B") under .oath that
intoxicating liquors were being sold, bartered and given
a'\vay in violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act at 222. 2'24 South Main Street, Helper, Carbon County, Utah.
Tthat upon the filing .of this Information J. W. Hammond
issued a Search Warrant (EAhibit '' C ") commanding
Perry Holt to search the premise-s named in said Information and to seize allliquor~s a'nd vessels .containing the
same and· all implements, furniture .and fixtures used or
kept for such illegal selling, and bartering of liquors in
violation .of the Liquor Laws ;of the State of Utah. ·That
on January 26, 1940, Perry Holt, together with A. H.
JaY'nes, .and other Inspe-ctors· of the Utah Liqu·or ~Control
·commission, unde·r autho·rity of ·the .S.earch Warrant
sea.r.che-d the premise-s in said Se·arch Warrant des·cribed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and found upon said premises a. quantity of whiskey.
That at said time the said Inspectors seized the whiskey
so found, together w·ith certain tangible personal property then located in and upon said premises and at .said
time took a c;omplete inventory of .said whiskey and :said
tangible personal property so seized. o~. January 27,
1940, Perry Holt made a. return on said Search Warrant,
listing all of the property seized on said premises (Exhibit '' D' ') said Return was filed together with .a Warrant with J. W. Hamm·ond, .Ju.stice of the Peace. J. W.
H·ammond later certified all the records and files in said
matter to the District Court of the SevEID.th Judicial District in and for Carbon C·ounty, State ·Of Utah. ·That on
said 27th day of J anua.ry, 1940, the said Perry Holt made
a Return (Exhibit '·' E ") to the Seventh Judicial District
Court in and for Carbon County, .State of Utah, and upo~n.
the filing of said Return Judge ~GeoTge Clhristensen,
Judge of said Seventh Judicial District Court in and for
Carbon County, State of Utah, did issue a Warrant of
Attachment (E·xhibit "F"), said Warrant of Attachment listed all of the .arti,cles seized by Perry H.olt as
listed in his Return on said Search Warrant. That on
the said 27th da.y of January, 1940, Victor Martelle, ;one
of the defendants 'named in said Return of P·erry H-olt,
filed in the said S·even th J udici.al District Court, in and
for Carbo·n County, State of Utah, his affidavit (Exhibit
''·G' '),praying that the Court immediately issue an Order
to Show Cause (Exhibit ''H"), direeted to Utah Liquor
Contr:o1 C-ommission, its agents, serv.am.ts and employee·s,
and particularly Perry Holt and· A. H. Jaynes, requiring
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them to appear before the said Court then and there to
show cause why they shouldn't (be permanently restrained, dur~ng the pendency of the action, from removing .any of t1he tangible personal property Ho· seized by
Perry I-Iolt from said premises. That upon the filing of
this Affidavit, the Court, that is, the Honorable George
Christensen, issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering
the Utah Liquor ,C:ontrol Commissio~n, its .agents, servants and employees, and p·articularly Perry H·olt .and
A. H. Jaynes, to appear before the said' Court at the
hour of ten o'clock A. M. ·On the 5th day of F'ebruary,
1940, to then and there show ·Cause why they be not restrained f:r:om removing said twngible personal property
until the determination of said a.ction on its merits. That
said Affidavit, and Order to ·Show Cause, were served
upon said Perry Holt and A. H. Jaynes at the premises
222-224 South M·ain, Helper, Carbon County, State of
Utah, while ·Said Perry Holt and A. H. Jaynes were rem·oving the tangible personal pr-operty, listed in said
Return of Inspector Holt, from the premises. That on
the 29th day of January, 1940, ·George H. Lunt, one of
the attorneys for the Utah Liquor Contr-ol Commission,
served upon the said Victor Martelle and filed with the
Court, the said Seventh Judicial District, a Motion to
Va!c.ate, Rescind and Set Aside and Hold for Naught the
Order to Show Cause (Exhibit ''I''). That on the 5th
day .of February, 1940, the MotiO'n. to Va:eate and Set
Aside, and ·the ·O:vder to Show c·ause were heard by the
Court and that on the 8th day of F:ehruary, 1940, the said
George Christensen, Judge of the ··said Court, made and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
entered ·an Order (Exhibit "M") decreeing among other
things that the Utah Liqu·or Control Commission, its
serva,nts and employees be restrained from removing
anything and everything from said premises at 22·2-224
South Main, Helper, Ca:r1hon County, State of Utah, except any personal property which could be used only and
exclusively for t1he purpose ~~ viola.ting the Liquor ·Control Act of the State of Utah. 'That o~n the said 5th day
of February, 1940, the Utah Liquor C·ontrol C:ommission
filed its Libel of Information (Exhibit "J") asking for
the condemnation and forfeiture· of the property seized
on the premises above named an·d as listed in the Return
of Inspector P-erry Holt. Along with said Libel of Information the above Court signed an Order to Show
Cause (Exhibit "K'') ordering tlhe defend'ants n.amed in
said Libel of Information tn show cause, if any they
have, ·On the 19th day of F:ehruary, 1940, w·hy the s.aid
tangible personal property should not be forfeited and
it further ordered that N-otice of Hearing be given as
provided by law (Exhibit '''L").

·The sole question for determination is wih!ether the
HonoraJble George Christensen, a.s judge of the ·Seventh
Judicial Court, exceeded the juri~sdiction of that court
when he issued the Order of January 27, 1940, requiring
the plaintiff herein to ·shnw ·Cause why it should not he
restrained from rem-oving the personal property, listed
in the Inspector's Return, from t1he Town Tavern. Also
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whether the Court exceeds its jurisdi,ction when it issued
its Order of February 8, 1940, wherein pla'in.tiff was restrained from removing the personal pr-operty from the
Town Tavern.
PLAINTIFF''S CO·NTEN'TIO·N.
Plaintiff contends that the .orders above referred to
were in excess of the jurisdiction ·of the .court because
A. That said ·Orders interfered with, hindered and
ma.de impossible the enforcement ·of the Utah Liquor
·Control Act, the enforcement of which were, and are,
the plain duty of plaintiff.
B. That the Liquor ·C:ontrol Act and particularly
,Sections 168 ·and 169 provide an adequate legal proceedings to pr.otec.t the interests of Victor Martelle and the
orders ·complained of are not provided for and are contr.ary to the procedure outlined in said sections.
ARGUME·NT.
Article V, Section 1, of the C:onstitution. of the State
o£ Utah, .provide for the Distribution of P:owers into
three departments of government, as follows:
''The powers of the government of the State of
Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; ~and no .Person charged with the exercise of power·s pr.operly belonging to .one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions apperSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
taining to either of the others, except in the cases
herein expres.sly directed or :permitted.''
The plaintiff is a. commission organized by the laws of
this State and is a. br·a~nch of the Exe.cutive department
of the State Government.
In proceedings ·Of this sort this ~Court ·has power and
authority to grant the type of relief, which in its judgment -protects all parties regardless of whether it is
Mandamus ·or Prohibition, that is, they have the authority
to is·sue both Writs -of Mandamus and Prohibition, if
both are ne-ces·sary to adequately protect the rights of the
parties.
In the case of
C,hrild, et al., vs. Ogden St'a;te Bavnk, et al.,
20 Pac. (2d) 599, p. ·603, 81 Utah 464,

the court has the following to say with respect to this
matter:
''An examination of the statement of positions of
the partie-s reveal·s a situation that calls for a
type of relief m:ore n.ea.r ly .analogous to the purpose of a Writ of Mandamus than to a Writ of
Prohibition, and ·at the same time standing alone
neither \vould bring albout the desired result. 'That
this Court ha.s the .authority to issue both Writs •of
Mandamus and Prohibition in s1ic:h a case is manifest. Cornstitution of Utah, Article 7, Section 4;
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Section 1643. It is
not the title but the subject matter of the petition
or -complaint and .ans\Yer that reveals the question ·submitted and determines the relief called
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for, and whether by Prohibition, by Mandamus, or
by ·combination of hoth. The questions pre·sented
are so rel-ated and in terdependant that adequate
relief may be had .only by granting of both forms
of relief. We see no reason w)hy this Court should
not proceed to grant such relief as will adequately
protect ,all parties and hasten. the determination
of the proceeding -and bring alhout promptness and
expedition in the liquidation of the bank. Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, ~S:e,ction 7407. 'The 'Vrit
of Prohibition i·s the counterpart o.f the Writ of
Mandate, it arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, ·eorpora.tion, board ·OT person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial when
such proceedings rare without or in excess of the
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, hoard
or person.' "
The law of this state seems well settled in proceedings
wherein Mandamus or Prohibition i·s sought against a.
judi·cial tribunal, that the question is one of jurisdiction
and not ·error. In other w·ords, the Court in. such proceedings does not determine how an inferior tribunal shall
act but determine-s whether or not the Court has authority to ,a,ct with reference to the particular matter involved. ·The power to do a judi·eial act must always underlie the d·oing of it. T1he provinces of the Writ of Ptohibition or Writ of Mandamus i·s designed to keep inferior judic~al and executive bodies within the limits of
their jurisdiction. ·This questio11 resolves into this, did
the Seventih Judicial District Cnurt have power to issue
its 0Tder.s of January 27, 1940 a:nd February 8, 1940,
above referred to. We recognize that it is not a question
of whether the court acted ·Corre-ctly or incorrectly, but
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whether the judicial act was, itself, warranted fby law.
A leading ease on this subjec:t is

. .4.ttcood vs. Cox, District Judge,
88 Utah 437 at 445, 55 Pac. (2d) 377.
The n1atter is gone into quite extensively in this case a.nd
numerous authorities are -cited. The following is taken
from this case in discussing the question of jurisdiction:
·'They all mean fundamentally, the power or
capacity given by law to a court, tribunal, board,
~body or officer to entertain, hear and determine
.certain controversies. The word is derived from
juris dicta-, 'I speak by the law'. It does not mean
that the court must speak correctly .by the law.
What it says may be incorrect. But it means
that its judicial action in respect to the matter
in regard to which the action pertains must itself
he warranted by law. It does not mean that it
must act or operate upon a controversy correctly, but it means that the law must permit it
to act upon. the ·C01?Jtr.oV'er sy
Juris diction
can never depend upon the merits of the case
brought before the Court, 'but only upon its right
to hear a;nd decide at all.' . . . 17 Standard
Encyc. of Proc. pages 658, 659, it is stated, 'The
test of the jurisdiction of the C-ourt to grant
relief is not whether good cause for granting the
relief exists, but whether the tribu.nal assuming
to act had power to enter upon the enquiry in the
particular case, or grant the relief for any cause,
and this must be sought for in the general nature
of the pottvers of the court or the general law·s
defining this ju.risdiction. . . . State vs. Stobie,
19·4 Mo. 14, 92 S. W. 191, 197, 'Ju.risdiction is au,...
thority to hear and d:etermine a cause. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine, it
does not depend either upon the regularity of
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the exercise of that power or u.pon the rightfulness of decisions made.' ".
It is the contention ·of the plaintiff in this case that
the Order.s signed by the ·C·ourt on January 27, 1940 and
February 8, 1940 were beyond its power and authority.
The distinction between what amounts to jurisdiction and
error discussed in the case of
Olsen vs. District Court of Salt Lake
County, et atl., 93 Utah 145, 71 p·a·c. (2d)
529.

In that ·case the .complaint was filed and the defendant
interposed a demurrer. Affidavit and notice was served
on .attorn~y for plaintiff by defendant to· take plaintiff's
deposition. The plaintiff failed to Hppear and the court
overruled the demurrer .of defendant, at which time the
defendant called attention to the ,c.ourt that it had served
a notice on the plaintiff's .attorney .of the taking of plaintiff's deposition ·and that he hBJd failed to appear so the
court without anything further overruled the demurrer
and made an ·Order that the defendant would have ten
days from the time the plain tiff .appeared to have- 1h~s deposition taken i:n which to file his an·swer. The p1aintiff
took the matter up to this court on certior,ari. The court
has the following to say:
"It appears to us from the foregoing that the
Court did not regularly pursue the authority conferred, while the lower court in its order disposed
of the den1urrer and so far as that matter \Yas
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concerned \Vas acting ''rithin the authority conferred or by warrant of law, yet it injected into
the order making disposition of the demurrer and
as a part thereof an Order which there was no
\Yarrant in la\Y for it to make and which had no
bearing on the matter presented by the demurrer.
Its jurisdiction in that regard had not been invoked by anything bef·oTe the Court and its conclusions in regard thereto were wholly without
support in law. Certainly the Court did not
regularly pursue the authority conferred and
to that extent exceeded its jurisdiction.''
T,his ca-se is authority for the prop·osition that a court. in
the commencement of proceedings ma.y have jurisdiction
but it does not follow that all-orders and aets of the court
thereafter made in the proeeedings are likewise within
its jurisdiction. It then becomes a question of jurisdirc:tion and not one of error.

In the a.bove case the Court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter but with reference to the order·s heretofore referred to the defendant Court exceeded its jurisdiction.
Writ of Prohibition or Writ of Mandamus will lie
when it is Slhown that an inferior tribunal ha;s exceed.ed
its jurisdiction .and that the party seekin,g the writ has
no plain, speedy and adequate relief at law.

Construction Securities Co. vs. District
Court of Third Jttdicial District, in and
for Salt Lake Cownty, et al., 39 Pac.
(2d) 707, 85 Utah 346.
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12.
A. THE ORDERS OF THE DEFENDANT C'OURT HINDERED
AND MADE THE' ENFORCE.MENT OF THE UTAH LIQUOR
CONTROL. ACT' AN IMPOSSIBILITY AND PREVENTEID
PLAINTI~F

F'ROM DISCHARGING THE DUTIES IMPOSED

ON IT BY LAW.

You will observe that from the .statement of facts
Perry Holt was an Inspector f.nr the Utah Liquor Control
Commission, and upon the :filing of an..affidavit or information with the Justice .of the Peace, obtained a Search
Warrant to search the premises at 2.22-224 South ·Main,
Helper, Carbon County, State ·Of Utah, and armed with
this search warrant he did sear.ch the premises and he
found a quantity of whiskey unlawfully kept on said
premises. That he arrested the man in ·ch.arge, seized
the "WJhliskey together with certain personal property listed in ·his Return .and made return to tlie Justice of the
Peace. The actions of P·erry H·olt in securing the search
warrant, in searchin.g the premises and .seizing the property w.as pursuant to the authority conferred in Section
164, Chapter 43, Law·s of Utah, 1935, whiCJh reads as
follows:
1

If any district, county, city or tovvn attorney, or
any peace officer, or any other person has probable
cause to believe that al·coho1ic beverages are pos·Sessed, manufactured, sold, hartered, given away
·nr otherwise furnished in violation of this act,
or are kept for the purpose of selling, bartering
or giving away or otherwise furnishing the same
in violation of law, it shall be the duty of such
attorney, peace officer or person forthwith to
make and file with the judge .of the district or
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city court, or any city, town or precinct justice
of the peace, written inforn1ation supported by
his oath or affirmation that he has information
and reason to belive that this act is being violated
at a certain place, stating the facts within his
know·1edge ~ and he shall describe as particularly
as n1ay be the place, and the names of the persons,
if known, participating in such unlawful act. Such
judge or justice of the peace, upon finding probable cause to believe that the facts stated in such
information are true, ·Shall issue a search warrant, directed to any peace officer in the -county
whom the complainant may designate if he shall
designate such peace .·o-fficer, otherwise to any
peace officer in the county, describing as particularly as may be the alcoholic :beverages and the
place des-cribed in said information, and the persons named or described therein as the owners
or keepers of such alcoholic beverages; commanding the officer to search thor·oughly the place,
and, on finding alcoholic beverages in unlawful
possession or use, to arrest persons found therein
and bring them before the court of justice, to
seize such alcoholic beverages, with the vessels
containing them, and all implements, furniture
and fixtures used or kept for ·such illegal acts, and
to keep the same securely until final a.ction is ha.d
thereon. Whereup·on the officer to whom such warrant .shall ihe delivered shall forthwith obey and
execute as effectively as possible the commands
of the warrant, and make return promptly ·of his
doing to the court or justice, with an itemized
inventory of all alcoholic beverages and property
or things seized, and a list of all persons in whose
possession the same were f.ound, if any; and, if
no person is found in possession of such alcoholic
beverages or property, his return shall so state.
Such officer shall securely keep all alcoholic beverages and other things S·O seized by him until
final action is had thereon. A copy of the warrant shall be served upon the person or persons
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found in possession of any alcoholic beverages,
furniture or fixtures so seized, and, if no person
is found in possession thereof, a copy of the warrant shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the
building or room wherein the same are found.
It will be observed from this section that it was mandatory for Perry Holt, upon finding liquor unlawfully kept
on said premises, to take i'n.to his po,ssession the whiskey,
together with the implements, furniture and fixtures
located on .s.aid premises, used or kept in connection with
the violation and make his return as provided by law.
'Section 168, ·Chapter 49', Laws of U truh', 1937, amon.g
·other things, provides tlie procedure after sueh a seizure,
to-wit:
In the event of a seizure as pr·o·vided for in Section 164, the officer shall forthwith make a return
of his acts thereunder, and if the warrant was
.issued by a .city court or justice of the peace and
by such return it .appears that tangible pe~s'Onal
property "\\7as seized by said officer, the jurisdiction of the city court or justice of the peace ·Shall
thereupon ·cease except that the city court or
justice issuing such warrant shall forthwith ·certify the record and all files to the district court
of the county in which said premises are situated
and from the time of filing such records and files
with the clerk of the district court it shall have
jurisdiction to proceed with the caus~ and determine the merits thereof as provided by law.
This section w.as followed by Insperetor P·erry Holt.
Inspector Holt was .a peace .officer at the time of the
seizure. Section 174, Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1935,
set forth:
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Inspectors appointed under this act, sheriffs,
deputy sheriffs, -constables, marshals, police officers, n1embers of the state highway patrol, and
other officers and employes of the state, and -of
any subdivision or agency thereof, are vested with
the powers of peace officers and powers necessary
to enforce the provisions of this act.
From the fact·s and from the law qu.oted there is no
question but that Perry Holt, as' Inspector for the Plaintiff, was discharging a plain mandatory duty imposed
upon him by lawr. The mandate ·Of the statute, upon finding liquor unlawfully kept on the premises, is to seize
the implements, furniture and fixtures therein kept in
connectio-n with the violation and to take the same into
his possession. The power to seize carries with it the
power to remove t1he enumerated personal property to a
place of safe keepin.g is recognized by all the courts. A
leading case on this pr·oposition is

Stork Restaurant Corporation vs. McCampbell, 55 Fed. (2d) 687 N. Y.
Plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the ·Court on the
ground that the proposed acti·on of defendants would
violate the eonstitutional provisions against deprivin.g

a. person of his property without due process of law.
Plaintiff alleged that pr01hlibiti·nn agents under defendants direction, entered and took pos,session of plaintiff's
premises, made arrests and were preparing to· remove
furnishings and fixtures. Plaintiff alleged irreparable
damage, etc., and asks for restraining order. On the
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question of the .officers right to remove the property tihe
court said :
"As a general proposition, the right of a public
officer to seize personal property -carriers with
it the right to remove the property from the
premises. This is certainly true of a sheriff on
attachment, or execution, unless removal would
result in destruction of the property. 'When he
seizes, he may remove it for safe keeping, and this
is not only to give effect to the seizure, but for
his own security'. Catlin v. Jackson, 8 J.ohns.
(N.Y.) 520, 548. See also Mills v. Camp, 14 Conn.
219, 36 Am. Dec. 488; Williams v. Powell, 101
Mass. 467, 3 Am. Rep. 396.; Fullam v. Stearns,
30 Vt. 443; Grey v. Sheridan Electric Light Co.,
19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 152, 155. It must be fully
as true in the case of an offi-cer exercising the
right of distraint or of seizure forfeiture. The
denial of power to remove seized articles to a
place ·of security designated by law or selected
iby the officer would beyond doubt be an unwarranted restraint upon him and might seriously
·cripple the enforcement of the law. In fact, it is
a trespass for the officers to remain on the premises longer than is necessary to remove the seized
property, unless they have the owner's permission. See United States v. American Brewing
Co., (D. C.) 296 F. 772, 777; Rowley v. Rice, 11
Mete. (Mass.) 337. It is plain, therefore, that
~sueh articles as the defendant had the right to
seize on the plaintiff's premises be has the right
to remove from the plaintiff's premises."
On the question of the court-s jurisdiction to issue the
injunction prayed for the court said

@

690:

''Temporary injun·ction against a public officer
can be granted only on a strong showing that his
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threatened action is beyond the scope of his lawful authority. .
·Courts will not issue in-

junctions against administrativ\e officers on the
mere chance that they may not follow the law.''
At this point it must be borne in mind by this C.ourt
that the Orders signed by the defendant Court prevented
and made impossible the removin,g ·of the implements,
furniture and fixtures from said premises by Perry Holt.
It, therefore, made impossible the carrying out of the
plain, mandatory provision·s :of the statute and interfered
and prevented the enforceme·nt of the Utah Liquor Control Act. This is peculiarly significant in view of the fa,ct
that this Court has held in the ease -of

Wooras vs. Utah Liquor Control Commission, ______ Utah ------, 93 Pa.c. (2d) 45·5
that in a Libel proceeding the action is against the thing,
it tbeing an a-ction in rem. That the thing, itself, is the
offender and that seizure of the property, or the res, is
equiv.alent to the arrest of tibe person in a criminal case.
By the acts of the defendant C·ourt, as complained of,
plaintiff 'vas unable to make a proper seizure (arrest)
and the property was, a.s a result, .allowed to· remain in,
the premises under the same conditi·on.s to be used from
that time on in connection with the violation of the Utah
Liquor Control Act. Sectio·n 200, Chapter 43, Laws of
Utah, 19·35, recognizes no property rights in this type
of property, to-wit:
There .shall he no property rights whatsoever in
any alcoholic beverages, packages, vessels, apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pliances, fixtures, bars, furniture and implements
kept or used for the purpose of violating, or used
in violation of, any provision of this act.
T'he law seems to be yery definitely fixed that courts
.cannot, by its orders, pro-cesses or .a,ctiorns, interfere with,
impede, hinder and prevent public official·s, their agents,
.servants and employees, from ·enforcing the law and discharging a duty in1posed upon them as such by law and
when Courts assume to act, and by its orders and processes do act, with reference tn ma.tter·s the effect of
w·hich is to hinder, delay, interfere with, impede and prevent such public officials, t1heir agents, .servants and employees, from discharging duties imposed upon them by
law then such BJets op. the part of the court are in excess
of their jurisdiction .and are without authority in law.
That Courts exeeed their jurisdiction when they, by
their orders and processes, interfere with t!he ordinary
functions of other branches of government, particularly
the executive department, is borne out by the following
case:

Selecmarn, et al., v. Ma.tthews, et al., State
H'ightva.y Commission, 15 ,S.. \V. (2d)
7'88.
"Wbere injunction proceedings were 0ommenced against
the Highway ·Commi·ssion over changing the location of
certain roads. The law ·of the State confers the powers
to locate state highways upon. the Highway C·ommis.sion,

etc.,
"But if it be -contended that the statute as a whole
contains implications which require state highSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

'vays to be 'located in the interest of economy
and directness of routes,' it is sufficient to sa!·
that the power to determine the facts in every
case is vested exclusively in the state highway
comn1ission ; if the Legislature had in tended that
the commission's findings should be subjected to
judicial review, it doubtless would have said so.
'An officer to whom public duties are confided by
law, is not subject to the control of the .courts in
the exercise of the judgment and discretion which
the law reo·oses in him as a part ·of his official
functions. Certain powers and duties are confided
to those officers, and to them alone, and hovvever
the courts may, in ascertaining the rights of parties in suits properly before them, pass upon the
legality of their acts, after the matter has once
passed bey·ond their control, there exists no pOV\Ter
in the courts, by any of its processes, to act upon
the officer so as to interfere with the exercise of
that jud~ent while the matter is properly before
him for action. The reason for this is, that the
law reposes this discretion in him f.or that occasion, and not in the courts. The doctrine, therefore, is as ap·plicable to the writ, of injunction as
it is to the writ of mandamus.' Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall. 347, 352, 19 L. Ed. 62, 65, Kearney
v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 406, 144 S. W. 904.
To grant an injunction in this case w·ould be to
interfere with the ordinary functions of the ex·ecutive department of the state government; that
the ·courts will not do. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234
U. S. 627, 34 S. Ct. 938, 5S L. Eid. 1'506. ''
In an action brought by certain taxpayers to enjoin
Superintendent of .S,chool~ from designating certain
school district, etc., the court in
Moore et al. v. Porterfield, et al.,
257 Pac. 307 (Okla.)
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says:
"The law presumes the validity and regularity of
their ·official duty, and this presumption obtains
until overcome by proof, as to the acts involving
the performance of ministerial or administrative
duties. Watkins v. Havighorst, 13 Okl. 128, 74
P~a.c. 318.
Under section 3, art. 13, of the Constitution of
Oklahoma, separate schools for white and colored
-children, with like accommodations, must be provided by the Legislature, which must be impartially maintained.
We cannot presume that the defendant, as county
superintendent of public instruction, will violate
the foregoing provisions of our Constitution, but,
on the contrary, we must presume that he will
do his duty. Under Section 3, Chapter 219, article
15, Session Laws of 1913 (section 10569, C. 0. S.
1921), as construed by J urnper et al. v. Lyles, 77
Okl. 57, 185 Pac. 1084, the county superintendent
of public instruction of a county is authorized
to designate what school or schools in each school
district shall be the separate s.chool, and which
class of children, either white or colored, shall
have the privilege of attending such separate
school or schools of said school district. This
discretionary power of the county superintendent
will not be controlled by injunction, unless it appears that such contemplated action is based upon
grounds or reasons .clearly untenable ·Or unreasonable."
kndin
J( elley

v. J( avanaugh, Chief of Police,
3 Fed. Supp. 6·66.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
An action \Yas br·ought for an injunction restraining the
defendant from seizing· and destroying certain mint vending machines. There the court said :
''Courts of equity have no power to restrain public officers by injunction fron1 acts which they are
require-d by law to perform. Mere apprehension
of unauthorized acts by public officers will not
authorize the issuance ,of an injunction. Proof of
threatened breach of authority must be clear and
convincing. This rule is specially applicable
\Yhere the application for a temporary injunction
is based upon affidavits. See Corpus Juris, pages
240 et ·seq.; Triangle Mint Corp v. Mulrooney,
257 N. Y. 200, 177 N. E. 420.
In view of this denial and upon all of the proofs
submitted upon this motion, the application for
a temporary injunction should be denied. The
presumption may be indulged in that defendant
will observe the decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals and refrain from the :seizure of plaintiff's nonconvertible mint vending machines pending the trial of the case. Of course, it is possible
some method or means may be employed whereby
the machines in question are used for gambling
pur.pnses. In that event, upon the proof that any
particular machine is being used for gambling
purpose, defendant, not only has the right, but
it is his duty, to seize, such machine and arrest the
person in possession thereof.''
Likewise the court \vill prohilbit \Yhen an injunction
is issued which ex·ceeds the

jurisdi~c.tion

of the Court. In

Gordon, et al. v. Smitlz, Chancellor,
120 S. W. (2d) 325.
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This was a petition for restraining order against the
Superintendent of the Arkansas Police, .and .other of~
ficers, to restrain them from arresting, threatening to
arrest, etc., plaintiffs, or other ·citizens for operating
automobiles upon the highways. The .court issued a temporary restraining order, and the petitioners filed their
petition for a Writ .o.f Prohibition, alleging t1hat the
chancery ·court of Union County had no jurisdiction for
the reason that the con1.plai·nt seeks to- enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute, and .seeks to endoin the criminal prosecution of per.s-ons who have not complied with
t1he provisions of the law.
''The office of the writ of prohibition is tn restrain an inferior tribunal from proceeding in a
matter :not within its jurisdiction; it is never
granted unless the inferior tribunal has clearly
exceeded its authority and the party applying for
it has no other protection against the wr·ong that
shall be done by such usurpation. We have many
times held that when the Court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the question of its
jurisdiction of the pers·on turns upon some fact
to be determined by the court, its decision that
it has jurisdiction is an error, and prohibition is
not the remedy. But in the instant case, the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
the question of the existence or non-existence of
jurisdiction does not depend on contested facts
which the inferior court is competent to inquire
into and determine~ Sparkman Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Bush, 189 Ark. 391, 7·2 S. E. (2d) 527.
'Chancery ·courts will not interfere by way ·of injunction to prevent anticipated criminal prose~cutions.
The .city through her citizens has. the
right to enforce the ordinance, if valid. A court
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of chancery will not entertain a contest over the
question as to the validity of the ordinance and
restrain prosecutions pen·ding the determination
of that question, as the whole matter ·can be settled
in a court of law where only the violati·on of the
ordinance, if valid, can be punished.' Rider v.
Leatherman, 85 Ark. 230, 107 S. ,V. 996, 997.
The ·suit in the chancery court was for the purpose
of restraining prosecutions under a criminal
statute. There are no contested facts which the
lower court might examine and determine as to
its jurisdiction, but the court had no jurisdiction
of the subject matter.
The chancery court had no jurisdiction and the
writ of prohibition is therefore granted.''
When an executive offieer is directed by la.w to perform a .certain duty the courts have n~o' jurisdiction to
interfere with the performance of that duty. In

State ex rel. Carson, Dist. Atty. v. K ozer,
Secretary of State, 270 Pac. 513, 226
Ore. 641.
This suit was instituted by the State Highway Commission of Oregon to obtain an injunction. against the defendant, as secretary of State, to enjoin him from certifying and printi·ng ·On the official ballot for the ensuing
election the ballot title and numbers of proposed initiative
measure to amend the existing motor ve·hicle law. It was
admitted that the .se.cretary of state had followed the statute with reference to this matter. The court says:
"Where an initiative· petition has been filed in
the office of the secretary of state, is in pr.oper
form, properly verified, contains the requisite
number of signatures, and shows upon its face
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that all of the statutory directions entitling it to
be filed have been ·complied with, the statute
makes it the imperative duty of the secretary of
.state to file the petition, and, upon its bei·ng filed,
to ,eertify a.nd print t1he ballot title and numbers
on the official ballot, so that it ·can be voted upon.
The relator contends that, in the performance of
this duty by the secretary of state, he was acting
in a ministerial capacity, and was not engaged in
any legislation, and argues from this that the
courts do have power to enjoin the secretary of
state if the bill itself, when enacted, would be
unconstitutional. Where the law defines and prescribes the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the
exercise of diseretion or judgment, the act is
ministerial. 34 C. J. 1179.
It is clear that no executive officer can exercise
any legislative power, and that the acts of the
secretary of state in accepting and filing an initiative measure, where all statutory requirements
have been complied with, and in certifying and
printing the ballot title and numbers of the measure on the official ballot, are ministerial in nature,
and that he is not exercising .any legislative power,
but is performing the acts which, under the .statute, are essential to the exercise of the legislative power by the people of the state, and, while
he is acting purely in a ministerial capacity, and
not exercising any discretion, the law itself enj·oins upon him the p·erformance of the .acts themselves, and it would seem to follow, as a necessary
·consequence, where a duty is imposed upon a public offi.cial to do an official act, upon compliance
by others of all the statutory requirements necessary to make it the duty of the official to do the
act, that no court would have power to enjoin
the officer from the doing of such act. Under
the circumstances stated, the direction·s of the
statute upon the secretary of state are plainly
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mandatory, and require the performance by him
·of the very duty which relator :seeks to have the
·Court enjoin him from doing. The courts have
no po,Yer to direct a public official to refuse to
perform a duty imposed upon him by the mandatory provisions ·of the statute.''
There are numerous ·other cases in many juri·sdictions that hold \Yith t1he above cases, that acts of courts
that prevent or hinder public ;officials from carrying out
the duties and doing the things imposed on them by the
clear provisions -of the law, are in e~cess of their jurisdicti·on and therefore without authority of law.
With respect to acts, orders .aTid pr;o,ces-ses of courts
WJhich interfere with and prevent the enfor·cement of
criminal statutes and the arrest of law violators, it .see~s
to be the almost universal rule, that such acts, orders and
processes are in excess of the juri.sdicti.on of the court.
We call the 0ourt 's attention, by title a·nd citation only,
to a number of cases that adhere to this view:
Harmon, et al., vs. Commissioner of Police
of Boston, 174 N. E. 198; ·
Strand Amusement Co., et al., vs. City of
Owensboro, et al., 47 S. W. (2d) 710,
Ky.;
Dell Pub. Co. vs. Beggans, Direct-or of Public Safety, et a.l., 158 Atl. 765 N. J.
Harvie vs. Heise, Sheriff, et al.,
148 S. E. 66. So. Car.;
Colbert, Sheriff of Carbon County, et al.,
vs. Su.perior Confection Co., 6 Pac. (2d)
791, Okla. ;
,
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Collison vs. Kirkpatrick,
292 Pae. 54, Okla.
B. THAT THE LIQUOR CONTROL ACT AND PARTICULARLY SECTIONS 16·8 AND 169 PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE
l..~EGAL

PROCEEDINGS TO PROTECT THE. INTERESTS

OF VICTOR MARTELLE AND THE ORDER COMPLAINED
·OF ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR AND ARE CONTRARY TO
·THE PROCEDURE OUTLINED IN SAID SECTIONS.

Under ·Se-ction 168, ·supra, after the Inspeetor has
made his return the Justice ,certifies all of the records
and files to the District Court -of the County and the District Court, from then on, has jurisdiction to determine
the merits of the case. The court is required to fix time
for. hearing and .cause notice thereon to be served personally and by posting which .shall describe the alc.oholic
beverages and the persional property that has !been seized,
to .specify the time and place for hearing. Should anyone
appear and ,claim any of the property involved shall be
made a party to the proceedings. The se-ction then provides a.s foll,ows:
lf the court shall find from the evidence presented
that violations of this act did occur upon the
premise wherein said alcoholic beverages or other
tangible personal property so seized by said arresting officer which was located upon said premises was also used in connection with violation
·of this act and shall be forfeited as hereafter
provided unless any of the claimants prove to
the satisfaction of the eourt. that said tangible
personal property or some parts thereof were not
used for any purpose whatsoever in connection
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\vith the operation of the business conducted on
the premises where .said personal property was
seized.
The Legislature undoubtedly intended Section 168 to, he
the exclusive method of proceeding .after evidence of a ·
violation of the Liquor Act had be·come available to the
Comm.issi<Yn. This is made very manifest by Section 169
which reads as £ollows :
When any alcoholi~c beverage, packages, property or other things shall have been seized by
virtue of any warrant, the same shall not· be discharged or returned to any person claiming the
.same by reason of any alleged insufficiency of
des·cription i·n the \Varrant, ot the aleoholic bev·erages, property or place, nor by order in claim
and delivery, or any other _summary pr,ocess, but
the claimant shall only have the right to be heard
on the merits of the ·case; and final judgment of
conviction in such proceedings shall in all. cases
be a bar to all suits for the recovery of any alcoholic beverages or ·other things seized, or o£ · the
value ·of the same, or for damages alleged to have
arisen 'by reason of the ·seizing and detention
thereof.
The law is quite uniform that a pr-e;sumption attends
the acts of the public officer, to the effe-ct that t·he- facts
exist which justifies his action. In other wor.ds, there is
always a presumption that official a1crts have been and are
properly performed, and in general, it is to be pre.sumed
that everything d·one by ,a•n official in connection with
the performance of an .official act in the line o£" his duty
was legally done, whether prior to the act, such as giving
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notice, or de,termining the existence of conditions prescribed as a prerequisite to legal acti~on, or subsequent
to such act,
22 C. J. Pages 130-34

unles·s the presumption of regularity is rebutted, it is
conclusive.
22 C. J. Page 136

A·c:ts of a public officer ''which pre.suppose the existence
of other acts which makes them legally operative are presumptive proof in the matter."
R. H. Stearns vs. U. 8., 78 L. Ed. 647-653

quoting a principle announced by U. ,S:. Supreme

C~ourt

in

Bank of U. S. vs. Dandridge,
6 L. Ed. 552, 554
with reference to action 'by Board of Directors of Bank
of U.S.
The case of

Pacific States Box & Ba.sket Co. v. White,
80 L. Ed. 138
involved an ·order of the Department of Agriculture of
Oregon fixing the specifi.cation of berry boxes, it was contended that the rebuttable presumption of the existence
of a: state of facts ·suffieient to justify the exertion o.f the
police power atta.ches only to acts .of legislature; and that
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where the reg-ulation is the act of an adm~nistrative body,
no such presumption exists S·O' that tthe !burden of proving
the justifyi·ng facts is upon him "\Vho seek!s to sustain the
validity of the reg·ulation.
Tthe Supreme c.ourt refuses to accept this and holds
the ''presumption of the existence of facts justifying its
specific exer·cise attaches alike to ·statutes, to muni,cipal
ordinances, and to orders of administrative bodies''giving full reasoning.
CONCLUSION.
It is apparent from the forego·ing that if the action
of the defendant judge, in making the Orders of January
27, 1'940 and February 8, 1940, i·s within his jurisdiction
t1hen it lies within the power of the judge to nullify the
mandate of the legislature. To leave the intoxicating
liquors, implements, furniture and fixtures in the Town
Tavern, in the posse.ssion ·of Victor Martelle, during the
pendency of the action means two things. In the first
plare, that during the pendency of the a.ction Victor
Martelle may continue to operate in his illegal venture
without fear of additio'nal penalty, an·d in the second
place, that upon the determination of the case a-nd the
en teri·ng ·of the order of .confis.Cia tion, all of the property in the premises may have disappeared. In other
words, the entry of the Order·s herein ,c.omplaine·d of completely nullify n·ot only the P'O'wer of plaintiff to perform
the duties imposed by law hut completely nullify the
acts of the Legislature.
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It is respectfully submitted that t1he Alternative Writ
herein should be m.ade permanent, that henceforth the
seizure and trial ·of the property -charged with violating
the provisions of ~our Liquor ·C:ontrol Act may; be carried
out by an orderly procedure as provided by law.
Respeetfully submitted,
PARNELL BLACK,

D. HowE

MoFFAT,

H. L:UNT,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

GEORGE
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